Author: alexandernevsky

Book Review– Iraq After America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance by Joel Rayburn

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By Steven Knorr

Joel Rayburn is a former Army Colonel and intelligence officer. In Iraq After America, he examines the challenges Iraq has faced since American troop withdrawals in 2011. In order to resolve Iraqi instability, three fundamental issues that have long plagued Iraq must be addressed. The principle issues, according to Rayburn, are political authoritarianism, sectarian violence, and ongoing insurgency. While the title implies the state of Iraq after the recent war (2003-2011), the author goes into detail about the historical origins of the conflicts within the country today. It is because of these deep-rooted divisions Iraq has failed to achieve stability.Rayburn is critical of US foreign policy, arguing that the American approach to war since Korea has been self-obstructive.[1] Too many conflicts, in his view, have been undertaken without a winning strategy. Moreover, political leaders have blindly hoped for things to “turn up” that would allow for troop withdrawal.[2] Quick victory, though possible, could come at a cost that would be morally reprehensible. This means wars drag on and public support of the war wanes. Rayburn believes that these longer wars are more destructive than a war that could be ended quickly. To Rayburn, Iraq was a job left unfinished which has lead to the instability of the region since 2011. With the rise of ISIS after US troop withdrawals, it is hard to dispute these points. However, the decisively resolved conflicts in Panama, Granada, and the Balkans might refute a broad application of Rayburn’s assessment of US foreign policy.

The book discusses in detail the legacy of political authoritarianism in Iraq. In particular, Nouri al-Maliki is discussed, the former prime minister who grew from a weak premier into a political strongman. The root of Maliki authoritative power goes back five decades during the struggle between Shia Islamists and Iraqi Baathists. The Shia Dawa party was crushed by Saddam’s regime but would reemerge when Ayad Allawi was appointed interim Prime Minster of Iraq in 2004. Rayburn argues that under Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi state reversed the work of coalition on establishing a decentralized democracy. After the 2010 elections Maliki was able to return to power despite losing the election, a clear indicator of a slide back to authoritarianism. In this and other respects, Maliki’s leadership was incredibly damaging to fragile Iraqi democracy, and Maliki and his Dawa faction were able to consolidate a considerable amount of power.

In the middle chapters, Rayburn argues that the violent sectarian divisions within Iraq are not natural and were hinted at prior to the conflict[3]. Much sectarianism was manufactured by outside factions with their own interests, including Shia Iran-allied exiles returning to Iraq. These Shia factions were determined to wreak havoc on former Baathist party members and Sunnis who persecuted the Iraqi Shia party from the 1970s through 90s. The religious rivalries within Iraqi society dominated post-invasion politics. In 2005, the citizens of Baghdad were displaced and separated into sectarian enclaves throughout the city. This lead to the religious cleansing of neighborhoods as Shia poured out of the slums of Baghdad into wealthier Sunni neighborhoods. The sectarian violence escalated into a full-blown civil war that took place from 2005-2008.

Because sectarianism has seeped into every aspect of Iraqi society, strongmen within Iraqi politics and the Shia resistance movement will continue to prevent Iraq from progressing into a functional, unified state. The situation could be compared to Yugoslavia, as a deeply divided country fractured by religious and political interests. While Iraq is divided up into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish enclaves, the best solution forward is a unified, singular Iraq. Violence would only escalate if sectarian enclaves were to break apart; this would also be catastrophic for regional stability. Rayburn acknowledges that keeping Iraq unified will be extremely difficult, because of internal divisions and outside interference. Little effort is placed on governing Sunni regions, and Iran continues to exert a destabilizing influence.

Sectarianism leads to insurgency, the ultimate plague of Iraq. Rayburn asserts that the Islamic State was not a surprise to the insiders or those who were paying attention[4]. Even if ISIS is defeated, with the continuation of sectarianism another spinoff insurgency will likely emerge. Here Rayburn is critical of the United States for its support of Maliki. The US supported Maliki because of his effectiveness against Al-Qaeda type terrorism. However, weapons given to the government made their way to Maliki’s political rivals and in turn into the hands of ISIS. Rayburn views the war on against ISIS as a part of a larger battle between Sunnis and Shias within Iraq[5]. Without the US guiding Iraq towards constructive policies that ease sectarianism, the current Iraqi regime will continue to be complacent regarding reconciliation with Sunni Iraqis.

Because of the broader battle between Shias, Sunnis, and even Kurds it is difficult to imagine conflict going away even after the defeat of ISIS. Rayburn makes very valid points regarding the Iraqi government and their unwillingness to address the divisions at hand. He convincingly demonstrates that the Iraqi government approach to governing will continue to damage Iraqi society.

Sources

[1] Rayburn, Joel. Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance (The Great Unraveling: the Remaking of the Middle East: Hoover Institution Press Publication; No. 643) . Hoover Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

[2] Ibid, location 113

[3] Ibid, Page 73

[4] Ibid, Page 121

[5] Ibid, Page 260

You can purchase Rayburn’s book on Amazon.

The Battle of Austerlitz: War of the Third Coalition

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Jules Jacquet, Cuirassiers at Austerlitz (1874)

In a series of lightening campaigns against Austria and Russia, Napoleon led France to victory against overwhelming odds. The Battle of Austerlitz that occurred during the War of the Third Coalition (1803-1806) would forever change the shape of central Europe. 

By Steven Knorr

The Formation of the Third Coalition (August 1805 – December 1806)

Since 1792, France had been at war with all of the major powers of Europe; though peace had been made with each in turn, Great Britain held out the longest. In March 1802, the Treaty of Amiens ended the hostilities between the United Kingdom and France. Europe seemed at peace. But conflict arose quickly as the British and the Swedes made an agreement that would lead to the forming of the Third Coalition against France. Russia and Austria would also join this coalition; Austria in particular was keen on revenge after suffering embarrassing defeats and ceding territory in the First and Second Coalition wars. The first two coalitions were waged against revolutionary France; the Third Coalition however would mark the beginning of what is now known as the Napoleonic wars. In May 1803, before these alliances were finalized, the UK declared war on Napoleon’s France. By August 1805, Russia and Austria had joined in and all Europe was again at war.

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Europe, 1803. Map made from template here.

Napoleon, French Emperor after 1804, developed ambitious plans for invading the British Isles. He assembled a massive invasion force around 200,000 men for the task. But with creation of the Third Coalition and threats looming on the continent, Napoleon abandoned his plans of invasion and turned his attention eastward. Though Napoleon discarded his invasion plan, all was not lost. French troops gained invaluable experience in the months of training that would prove to be of service in their upcoming campaign.

The Ulm Campaign (25 September – 20 October, 1805)

The Austrians moved towards France by concentrating their forces near the city of Ulm, at the time part of the Electorate of Bavaria, a state in the Holy Roman Empire. Karl Mack was the commander of the Austrian forces. He instituted reforms to the army on the eve of the war which would lead to insufficient officer training. This greatly hindered their military organization as officers did not have the proper training to coordinate troop movements. In the previous campaigns against the Austrians, the Italian theater became the primary focus for the French. The Austrians believed the French would focus heavily on Italy again and dispatched 95,000 troops into northern Italy and 72,000 into Ulm. The Austrians hoped with the heavily fortified and mountainous region of Ulm, they could hold out until Russian reinforcements arrived.

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Emperor Tiberius According to Tacitus

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By Steven Knorr

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The second Roman Emperor, Tiberius (r. 14-37 AD) was much loathed by the Senate. As a later member of the senatorial aristocracy, Tacitus (56-120) did not consider Tiberius favorably.

The Bias of Tacitus

The Annals by Tacitus is a written account of Roman history covering the period from the death of Augustus in 14 A.D to the reign of Nero (r. 54-68). Tacitus states that his purpose is to write without bitterness or partiality, but much of his account of the Emperor Tiberius (r. 14-37) seems biased given what we know about his reign. For the large majority of the Roman public, the rule of Tiberius was relatively peaceful. A person would not be in danger of violence unless they were a member of the imperial family or a member of the aristocracy. Tacitus demonstrates his inability to be impartial by stating that historians during the reigns of Augustus through Nero were unable to write the truth out of fear. He writes:

“Fine intellects were not wanting to describe the times of Augustus, till growing sycophancy scared them away. The histories of Tiberius, Caius, Claudius, and Nero, while they were in power, were falsified through terror, and after their death were written under the irritation of a recent hatred.” The Annals,  I

Rome during the imperial age had lost its “fine Roman character” that it had during the republican period and the harsh criticisms of Tacitus come from holding up the empire to the standard of the republic. The personal bias of Tacitus towards Roman Republican virtue seeps into his writing. He is often very critical of the imperial system and the Emperors themselves in the context of Republican virtue.

The Murder of Agrippa Postumus (14 AD)

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Agrippa Postumus was the son of Marcus Agrippa and the daughter of Augustus, Julia. Unlike his father, a favored general and close friend of the first emperor, Postumus was known for his brutish and unpalatable character. His murder in AD 14 was likely orchestrated to prevent him from challenging the succession of Tiberius.

According to Tacitus, the corruption of Rome began with Augustus, who with money and cheap food was able to concentrate on the functions of the senate . With all rivals dead, Augustus ruled unopposed and (according to Tacitus) the remaining nobility were more than willing to accept slavery for the sake of wealth and titles. Tiberius wasn’t originally interested in donning the purple but out of sheer luck (or Livia’s intervention) he became emperor after the death of Augustus. The opening act of his reign was a crime committed in the securing the throne. Agrippa Postumus, another one of Augustus’ adopted children, was murdered by his guards. Tacitus called this a crime, ignoring Tiberius’ claims that he was acting out on Augustus’s orders. Since Tiberius mentioned the death of Postumus to the senate one has to wonder how Tacitus would have known what was said on the matter outside of court records. The historian Walter Allen Jr. claims that historians accept the claim of assassination is because of the opportune time in which it came. Allen states:

“while stories about the death of Agrippa Postumus very likely arose out of similar gossip, Tacitus feels at liberty to treat them as fact because he has a reputable source upon which he depends; since the gossip had somehow crept into history, Tacitus had no qualms about repeating it.”

The liberal usage of gossip as fact is just one of many instances of Tacitus trying to blacken Tiberius’s character.

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